Restructuring issues with the ICJ

Over the last few decades, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention resulting in an enormous literature, much of which addresses the underuse of the Court. These share assumptions that improved organization and procedures are keys to increasing court’s activity quantitatively and quantitatively, this tends to bring common emphasis on reforms in the court. In September 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted an ambitious list of reforms of the UN structure, mandate and agenda. If implemented, it is going to be the most radical reform of the UN to date. Yet, the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the organization, has been largely ignored. States to honor their obligations to peaceful settlement of disputes and to promote wider acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, without mentioning any other concrete reform measures regarding the ICJ. This absence may be interpreted in several ways. It may be deemed to indicate that the world is content with the current state of affairs at and about the ICJ. Given the recent successes of the Court in terms of its caseload and its work product, this view may well be plausible. This absence may also be deemed to show a resignation that it is impossible to implement any reform proposals that would require amending the Charter and/or the Statute of the Court. If, as has been claimed, the UN Charter is a “finely tuned” instrument, the ICJ Part 3 of the Charter (consisting of Chapter XIV and the Statute) can be considered even more finely tuned, or at least more finely balanced and, therefore, more resistant to amendment. Indeed, as proposals for enlarging the membership of the Court were not accepted, while amendments have been made to the Charter in order to enlarge the membership of other UN organs, is a question for debate and further research.